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Abstract:
Hadlington (2017) conducted a survey using respondents from the United Kingdom (UK) to examine the relationship
between the three dimensions of impulsivity and risky cybersecurity behavior. His results showed that risky
cybersecurity behavior was positively correlated to attentional impulsivity and motor impulsivity, but was negatively
correlated with non-planning impulsivity. He also examined the relationship between internet addiction and attitude
towards cybersecurity and risky cybersecurity behaviors. Our longer term goal is to conduct research to gain an indepth understanding of the role of impulsivity in cybersecurity. Towards this end, we conducted a methodological
replication of the Hadlington study to determine the generalizability of his results for respondents from a different
country, i.e., the USA. Our replication confirmed most of the correlations between the variables in Hadlington’s study,
though there are some differences that need further examination. We further explored the data in search of
meaningful patterns in risky cybersecurity behaviors scale and its relationship with different impulsivity components.
Our exploratory analysis suggests a need for a typology of cybersecurity behaviors. Overall, we see a sufficient basis
to pursue research on the effects of impulsivity on risky security behaviors.
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A Replication Study of the Impact of Impulsivity on Risky Cybersecurity Behaviors

Introduction

The influence of personality characteristics on cybersecurity behaviors is a topic of interest to information
systems researchers (e.g., Shropshire, Warkentin, Johnston & Schmidt, 2006). For example, the influence
of Big Five personality factors on cybersecurity behaviors has been studied by Kennison and Chan-Tin
(2020) and that of psychopathy by Maasberg, Warren, and Beebe (2015). The role of impulsivity in
understanding security behavior has also been studied (e.g., Egelman & Peer, 2015a), but has otherwise
received limited attention. Impulsivity is ‘the urge to act spontaneously without reflecting on an action and
its consequences’ (Coutlee, Politzer, Hoyle, & Huettel, 2014, p. 2). Its relevance to cybersecurity can be
readily argued. For instance, a more impulsive person may be likelier to click on a phishing link (e.g.,
Butavicius, Parsons, Pattinson, & McCormac, 2016), or share a password with a friend or acquaintance,
both of which are considered risky cybersecurity behaviors. Thus, a study of the role of impulsivity on
cybersecurity behaviors is important.
Hadlington (2017) conducted a survey to enhance the understanding of the relationship between
impulsivity and risky cybersecurity behaviors. Impulsivity was viewed as a three-dimensional construct
based on the work of Patton, Stanford and Barratt (1995). The three dimensions are as follows: attentional
impulsivity, which refers to cognitive instability and the inability to focus on the tasks at hand; motor
impulsivity, which refers to the tendency to engage in actions on the spur of the moment; and, nonplanning, which impulsivity refers to the inability to plan complex mental tasks. Risky cybersecurity
behavior (RScB) refers to engagement in behaviors that are generally known to increase the vulnerability
of personal or organizational information assets. It also includes non-engagement in behaviors generally
known to decrease the vulnerability of personal or organizational information assets. In effect, risky
behaviors correspond to engagement in those acts that are listed as unsafe and prohibited, or, nonengagement in those acts that are listed as beneficial and recommended in compliance guidelines of
organizations. In addition to examining the effect of impulsivity, Hadlington also examined the relationship
between two other variables and RScB. These two variables were internet addiction (using an online
cognition scale (OCS)) and attitude towards cybersecurity (using the attitude towards cybersecurity and
cybercrime in business scale (ATC-IB)).
The purpose of the current study is to conduct a methodological replication (following the classifications
provided in Dennis and Valacich (2014)) of the Hadlington (2017) study to generalize his results, using a
respondent sample from a different country. The Hadlington study was done using respondents from the
United Kingdom (UK). The majority of our respondents are from the United States of America (USA).
While our primary interest is on the role of impulsivity, we replicated Hadlington’s study completely, and
report the results herein.
In addition to the replication, we conduct two explorations of the data. One, we conduct an exploratory
factor analysis (EFA) of the risky cybersecurity behavior items in search of clusters around which to
develop typologies. Two, we explore the correlation coefficients of each individual risky cybersecurity
behavior to the three dimensions of impulsivity in an effort to understand how different behaviors are
affected by impulsivity.
We divide our article into six sections. In section 2, we provide our reasoning for replication and discuss
the replication type and in section 3 we provide a summary of the original results and compare them to our
replication results. We discuss the key findings of the two studies and explore possible explanations for
observed differences in section 4. In section 5, we report the results of the EFA and discuss the
correlation results. In the last section, we provide concluding remarks.

2

Background for Replication & Replication Type

The relevant background for our replication includes three issues: (a) the need to use a targeted variable
for prediction in preference to the more general Big Five personality factors, (b) the choice of the
impulsivity scale, and, (c) the choice of the study for replication. We discuss each of these issues below.
Further, we present a more nuanced discussion of the classification of the replication type.
The relationship between personality characteristics and security behaviors is an area of research interest
in information systems. General personality scales, such as The “Big Five” traits (Borgatta, 1964) are
often used as the predictor personality characteristics (Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, & Ginther, 2018).
It has been argued that targeted traits may be stronger predictors of specific behaviors than the general
personality scales (Egelman & Peer, 2015a). Egelman and Peer have shown that decision making style
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and risk taking attitudes are better predictors of privacy attitudes than the five factor model. Based on this,
we believe that impulsivity will be a better predictor of some security behaviors and plan to examine the
domain in greater detail in our broader program of research. As a starting point, we replicated a study
involving impulsivity and security behaviors.
A direct scale is often used to measure impulsivity in studies of security behaviors that hypothesize an
explanatory role for impulsivity (e.g., Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS) (see Patton et al., (1995) for
discussion of scale)). The Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS) is a freestanding measure (i.e., not a subset of
another measure), which is directly focused on measuring impulsivity. The scale has been used in two
studies (Egelman & Peer, 2015a; Hadlington, 2017). The studies have shown that impulsivity influences
security related intentions/behaviors. The BIS scale (Patton et al., 1995) and abbreviated BIS scales
(Coutlee et al., 2014) are well established scales, and their limited use-to-date in security-related studies
have shown promising results. The choice of the scale is therefore appropriate. Additional studies, such
as our replication, would serve to establish the robustness of the scale.
Our choice of studies to replicate was limited to the two available studies (Egelman & Peer, 2015a;
Hadlington, 2017) using the impulsivity scale, which indicated a correlation between impulsivity and
security-related intentions/behaviors. Egelman and Peer studied the effect of impulsivity on security
behavior intentions. Hadlington studied the effect of impulsivity on security behaviors, as measured by
participant recall. We chose to replicate the Hadlington study on behaviors rather than the Egelman and
Peer study on intentions.
Earlier, we have stated that our study is a methodological replication, based on a strict application of the
categorization of replications proposed by Dennis and Valacich (2014). We use identical measures,
treatments, statistics, etc. as the Hadlington (2017) study, and conduct the replication in the US context
versus the UK context of the original study. It should be pointed out that despite the different national
contexts of the two studies, there are similarities in the social and business norms of the two contexts. We
mention this for the sake of completeness.
Overall, our primary purpose for the replication is to generalize the results from the UK context to the US
context. We have additionally explained how the Hadlington (2017) study was appropriate for our
replication, given our interest in the relationship between a targeted trait (i.e., impulsivity) and securityrelated behaviors.

3

Summary of Original Study & Replication Results

The original study by Hadlington (2017) was conducted in the United Kingdom (UK). Participants
completed an online survey. Participants were full-time or part-time employees. Five hundred and fifteen
usable responses were collected. The survey included scales for four variables: abbreviated
impulsiveness scale (ABIS) and online cognition scale (OCS) to measure internet addiction, risky
cybersecurity behaviors (RScB), and attitude towards cybersecurity and cybercrime in business (ATC-IB).
The items used in the replication study for all the scales are shown in Appendix A.
For ABIS, a modified version of the 13-item impulsivity scale proposed by Coutlee et al. (2014) was used.
The ABIS is based on the original 30-item Barratt’s Impulsiveness Scale (see Patton et al., 1995). Scoring
of items was done using a 4-point scale (1=never/rarely to 4=almost always/always). Internet addiction
was measured using the OCS developed by Davis, Flett, and Besser (2002). It was scored using a 7-point
Likert scale (1= strongly agree to 7=strongly disagree). This scale comprises four dimensions: social
comfort, loneliness, diminished impulse, and distraction. In the analyses, the scale is treated as a
unidimensional measure. Risky cybersecurity behavior is measured using a 20-item scale. This is partially
based on the security behaviors intentions scale (SeBIS) developed by Egelman and Peer (2015a,
2015b). The RScB scale asked participants to state how often they had engaged in a particular unsafe
cybersecurity activity during a previous six-month period. It was scored on a 7-point scale (0=never to
6=daily). To measure attitude, Hadlington developed the ATC-IB scale, in which high scores on the
measurement indicate positive attitude toward cybersecurity behavior. “The scale was constructed to
reflect a wide spectrum of attitudes towards both cybersecurity and cybercrime within a business context”
(Hadlington, 2017, p. 7). This scale was scored on a 4-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree to
4=strongly agree). Hadlington (2017) states that each of the scales had high internal validity scores.
The replication study was conducted in the United States using MTurk as a vehicle to recruit participants.
Participants completed an online survey. Participant demographics are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Demographics of Respondents
Demographic
Gender
Age

Ethnicity

Education

Category
Male
Female
20-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
40+
Caucasian
Asian
African American
Other
Less than high school
High School
College
Graduate

Percent
44.8
55.2
16.3
30.0
13.3
13.3
26.3
61.1
27.5
4.9
6.6
0.8
19.7
51.5
28.0

Respondents could withdraw from the survey at any time without any penalty. Trap questions were
embedded in the questionnaire to remove surveys in which participants appeared to have responded
randomly. A total of two hundred and fifty-one participants completed the survey. Two hundred and fortyfive usable responses were collected. The six surveys that were dropped failed to answer the trap
questions correctly. The response rate is not relevant as recruitment was through an open call and not
through solicitation of a specific number of individuals. We used the original 13-item ABIS impulsivity
scale (see Coutlee et al., 2014) to measure three dimensions of impulsivity, in contrast to the modified
scale used in the original study. We did not realize that the scale had been modified in Hadlington (2017)
prior to data gathering. Only two items are different between the scale that we used and the one used in
the original research. All other scales are the same as the original study. Cronbach’s alpha for all the
measurement scales and sub-scales was higher than 0.7 cut-off point; therefore, no item was dropped
from the survey questionnaire.
The results of average correlations for both the original and replicated studies are shown in Table 2. The
results of the replicated study are shown using bold text. Both studies show that both attentional
impulsivity and motor impulsivity are correlated to risky cybersecurity behavior, correlations which are as
expected, but the correlation coefficients are higher in the replicated study. Non-planning impulsivity is
negatively correlated to RScB in the original study, which is contrary to expectations and difficult to
explain. In the replicated study, non-planning impulsivity is not correlated to RScB. In both studies, all
three dimensions of impulsivity are negatively correlated to attitude to cybersecurity (ATC-IB) (i.e., high
impulsivity corresponds to negative attitude, and this is consistent with expectations).
Table 2. Comparison of Correlation Coefficients between Original and Replicated Studies

Impulsivity
Attention
Impulsivity
Motor
Impulsivity
NonPlanning
ATC-IB

Impulsivity
Attention

Impulsivity
Motor

0.36**
0.43**
0.60**
0.58**

0.14**
0.35**

Impulsivity NonPlanning

-0.24**
-0.24**
-0.11*
-0.27**
-0.53**
-0.21**
**
**
OCS
0.21
0.35
0.00
0.26**
0.48**
0.15*
RScB
0.15**
0.30**
-0.30a
0.23**
0.65**
0.07
**p<0.01; * p<0.05; a= p-value not indicated in original.
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-0.40**
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The original study also reported two other analyses: a hierarchical regression to assess internet addiction
(using the online cognition scale, OCS) and attitude to cybersecurity (ATC-IB) as predictors of RScB (see
Table 3), and a linear model for the effect of impulsivity subscales as predictors of risky cybersecurity
behaviors (see Table 4). The hierarchical regression to examine the explanatory powers of internet
addiction and attitude to cybersecurity as predictors of risky cybersecurity behaviors for both studies are
shown in Table 3 (results of replication shown in bold). Both internet addiction and attitude to
cybersecurity and cybercrime significantly predict risky cybersecurity behavior. No major difference is
seen between the results of the replicated and original study.
Table 3. Comparison of Original and Replicated Models of
OCS and ATC-IB as predictors of RScB
B

p-value

6.57
-0.72
0.14
0.64

0.001

32.89
4.81
0.14
0.34
-0.38
-1.63

0.000

Step 1
Constant
OCS

0.000

Step 2
Constant
OCS
ATC-IB

0.000
0.000

The results of regression analysis for three dimensions of impulsivity for both studies are shown in Table 4
(results of replication study shown in bold). Both motor and non-planning impulsivities were significant
predictors of RScB in both studies, but attentional impulsivity was a significant predictor in the original
study but not in the replication. This was curious because attentional impulsivity is positively correlated to
risky cybersecurity behavior in the replication (see Table 2), Such discrepancies usually occur either due
to multicollinearity or “suppression effect.” In the replication, maximum variance inflation factor (VIF
values) was less than 1.7 for the independent variables, indicating the absence of multicollinearity.
In Table 2, non-planning impulsivity has a weak correlation with risky cybersecurity behavior (correlation =
0.07, n.s.), but has a high correlation with attentional impulsivity (correlation coefficient = 0.59, p<0.01),
suggesting that non-planning impulsivity may be suppressing the effects of attentional impulsivity.
Table 4. Linear Model for ABIS Subscales as predictors of RScB
B

p-value

Constant

9.31
0.004
0.25
0.236
Attentional
3.73
0.02
Impulsivity
0.11
0.382
Motor Impulsivity
6.64
.000
1.87
.000
NonPlanning -2.90
0.023
Impulsivity
-0.38
0.001
R square for original study: 0.096; R square for replicated study: 0.446

To test for suppression effect we use a hierarchical regression, adding the three subscales of impulsivity
one by one. In the first model, with only non-planning impulsivity as the independent variable, the
coefficient of non-planning is positive and non-significant (see Table 5). However, when attentional
impulsivity is added (see Table 6), the coefficient for non-planning impulsivity changes sign (becomes
negative) and is not significant. It should be noted that the variance explained by attentional impulsivity
and non-planning impulsivity totals about 5% only. The total variance explained by all three impulsivity
dimensions is close to 45% (see Table 4), indicating that motor impulsivity accounts for almost 40% of the
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variance in risky cybersecurity behavior. A point of note is that the impulsivity dimensions explained only
about 10% of the variance in RScB in the original study.
Table 5. Linear Model of Non-Planning Impulsivity as a Predictor of RScB
B

P-value

Constant

1.52

.000

Non- Planning Impulsivity

0.13

0.283

The model is not significant; R square: 0.005

Table 6. Linear Model of Non-Planning Impulsivity and Attentional
Impulsivity as a Predictor of RScB
B

P-value

Constant

1.06

.000

Non- Planning Impulsivity

-1.70

0.207

Attentional Impulsivity

0.60

.000

R square: 0.05

In the next section, we compare the results of the replication with those of the original study.

4

Discussion of Replication

In the current study, we replicated Hadlington’s examination of the relationship between risky
cybersecurity behavior and three other variables: impulsivity, attitude to cybersecurity, and, internet
addiction (online cognition scale) (Hadlington, 2017). Table 7 provides a summary comparison of the two
studies, following the template used by D’Arcy, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, and Ginther (2018).
The comparison shows that both motor impulsivity and attentional impulsivity are significantly correlated to
risky security behaviors in both studies. Non-planning impulsivity was not correlated to RScB in the
replication but was in the original study. Of peripheral interest is that non-planning impulsivity was
correlated to OCS in the replication but not in the original study. A significant point of difference between
the two studies is 44.6% of the variance in RScB was explained in the impulsivity model in the replication,
while only 9.6% of variance was explained in the original study. It can also be noted that motor impulsivity
accounts for the bulk of the variance (about 40% of the 45% explained by the total model) in the
replication.
Table 7. Summary of the Comparison between Original Study and Replication Study
Characteristics
Data Collection
Survey Design
Population

Replication
Cross-sectional survey
Online Questionnaire
MTurk workers

Sampling
Participants recruited via MTurk
Sample size
Demographics

Analysis
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251 participants
Usable responses:245
Age: 20-60+;
Male: 44.8%; Female: 55.2%
(Table 1)
Correlation;
hierarchical
regression

Original Study
Cross-sectional survey
Online Questionnaire
Part-time or full-time employment in the
UK
Participants recruited via an online
questionnaire using Qualtrics Research
Panel
538 participants.
Usable responses: 515
Age: 18 – 84;
Males: 42.3%; Females: 57.7%
Correlation; hierarchical regression
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Findings

Motor impulsivity correlated to
RScB
Attentional
impulsivity
correlated to RScB
Non-planning impulsivity not
correlated to RScB
Non
planning
significantly
correlated with OCS

Motor impulsivity correlated to RScB
Attentional impulsivity correlated to
RScB
Non-planning impulsivity correlated to
RScB
Non planning is not correlated with OCS

R
square
for
Impulsivity Model

44.6%

9.6%

In terms of understanding the effects of impulsivity on risky security behaviors, the key findings that
emerge from both studies are: (a) impulsivity does correlate with risky security behaviors, and (b) motor
impulsivity is the most important explanatory behavior. The correlation between impulsivity and risky
security behaviors is consistent with correlations between impulsivity and other types of risky behaviors
(e.g., gambling, (Langewisch & Frisch, 1998), drug use (Ryb, Dischinger, Kufera, & Read, 2006), and
risky sexual behaviors (Winters, Botzet, Fahnhorst, Baumel, & Lee, 2009)). Motor impulsivity has been
shown to have a marginally higher correlation than attentional or non-planning impulsivity to other
behaviors (e.g, severity of alcohol dependence (Jakubczyk et al., 2013)). In general, motor impulsivity
appears to reduce control in goal-directed behaviors (Hogarth, Chase & Baess, 2012). Our objective in
conducting the replication was to examine the existence of a relationship between impulsivity and risky
security-related behaviors. The results broadly confirm the existence of a correlation between impulsivity
and risky security-related behaviors, but there are some differences between the two studies that need to
be examined further.
The differences in results of the two studies are threefold. First, the replication study explained almost
45% of the variance in the risky security behavior in contrast to about 10% in the original study. Second,
the correlations between most pairs of variables are higher in the replication than in the original study (see
Table 2). Lastly, the effects of non-planning impulsivity are different in several cases between the two
studies. Non-planning impulsivity was negatively correlated to risky cybersecurity behavior in the original,
but no significant correlation was observed in the replication. There was no significant correlation between
non-planning impulsivity and internet addiction (OCS) in the original, but a correlation was observed in the
replication. In the regression analysis, non-planning impulsivity was suppressing the effect of attentional
impulsivity in the replication, which was not observed in the original.
Of the three sets of differences, the most significant one is the difference in the extent of variance in risky
security behavior explained in the two studies. The second difference relates to the correlations between
variables. While the correlations in the replication are higher, the order of magnitude is not sufficiently
different to cause concern. The third set of differences relates to non-planning impulsivity. The role of nonplanning impulsivity in both studies is minimal, and hence the differences in correlations related to that
variable are not of much importance. We limit our discussion to explanations of the differences in the total
variance explained by impulsivity dimensions across the two studies.
We explore three possible explanations for the differences in the amount of variance explained in the two
studies: sample size, cultural differences, and common method variance. Under common method
variance, we address the possible effects of single source responses, and, social desirability bias. There
is evidence that demographics, such as gender and age, have been shown to influence impulsivity scores
(Chamberlain, Lust, & Grant, 2020). However, there is no clear difference in the demographics of the two
samples, so that is not discussed as a possible source of differences in results between the two studies.
In terms of sample size, the original study had 515 usable responses; the replication had only 245 usable
responses (out of 251). A smaller sample size might yield lower levels of significance of correlations.
Statistical power is positively correlated with the sample size, which means that a larger sample size gives
greater power (Suresh & Chandrashekara, 2012). However, in the current case, the significance levels in
the replication study are comparable to, or higher than, the significance levels in the original study, despite
the smaller sample size. Thus, the difference in sample size is unhelpful in explaining the differences in
the results.
In terms of the location of the study, the original study was conducted in the UK, and the replication in the
USA. An examination of the scores for Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980) shows only one
key difference between the two countries. The score for long-term orientation for the UK is higher than the
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score for the US. (51 vs. 26 [source: https://www.hofstede-insights.com/product/compare-countries/]).
Long-term orientation has been shown to correlate positively with increased voluntary security actions
(Aurigemma & Mattson, 2019). It may be argued that long-term orientation is more likely to lead to
compliance with security policies (i.e., users are more willing to accept the short-term inconveniences of
complying with the security policies for the longer term benefit of securing data). Thus, the RScB scores
for UK subjects may vary less than the RScB scores for the US subjects. This would reduce the level of
correlation between impulsivity scores and RScB for the original UK data in comparison to the replicated
data from the US subjects. In other words, the cultural dimension of long-term orientation may be
influencing the self-report responses of subjects to a different extent in the two groups. The inclusion of
scales to measure the dimensions of the culture construct in future research, similar to the work done by
Keil et al. (2000), would enable researchers to determine if cultural effects explain the differences in
results between the original study and the replication.
Another explanation might be provided by the notion of common method variance (CMV). CMV is
“variance that is attributable to the measurement method rather than to the constructs the measures
represent” (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 879). The higher correlation in the replication sample could result
from greater common method bias in the US sample, related to the use of a single source for the
measurement of all variables. Admittedly, this is a possibility. However, there is no definitive argument to
suggest that CMV in the US study would be higher than the CMV in the UK study. In both studies, each
respondent provides the data on impulsivity scales and RScB (i.e., variables are being measured based
on responses of a single source). Thus there is no reason to expect greater CMV in the replicated study
from this source. There are differences in the recruited respondents (employees in the original UK study
versus MTurk respondents in the USA replication study) and possibly in the survey administration method
(unclear in the UK study versus online in the replication study). In future research, it may be worth
exploring if either of these factors could explain possible differences in CMV across the two studies.
Social desirability bias (SDB) is another source of response bias that could result from the measurement
method (i.e., bias resulting from self-reported scores). SDB refers to the under- or over-reporting of
behaviors by respondents to appear more acceptable, or gain the approval of others (Aivazpour, Valecha,
& Chakraborty, 2022; King & Bruner, 2000). With respect to self-report of risky security behaviors, SDB in
responses is a distinct possibility. It may also be argued that respondents recruited from an employee pool
are more likely to engage in socially desirable responding than anonymous respondents recruited via the
online MTurk system. SDB would lead to self-reports of higher levels of compliance amongst those who
comply less. No comparable bias is likely in the measurement of the dimensions of impulsivity. This would
narrow the range of scores for RScB, but not that of impulsivity scores, leading to lower levels of
correlation between impulsivity and RScB. Since SDB is likely to be higher in the employee pool of the
original study, the correlations between RScB and impulsivity are likely to be lower in that pool than in the
pool of anonymous MTurk respondents of the replication study.
We reiterate that the explanations offered for the differences in the levels of the correlations are somewhat
speculative, and need empirical verification. Future studies should, in particular, focus on detecting the
presence of common method variance, both from single source measurement bias and social desirability
bias, and eliminating them when possible.

5

Exploration of the Data

The current study, along with that of Hadlington’s research, and that of Egelman and Peer (2015a),
provides a good starting point for the study of impulsivity in risky cybersecurity behaviors. However, there
is potential for placing their research and consequently our current work on a more rigorous theoretical
footing. The three studies base their work on an established and robust body of work for measuring
impulsiveness. In contrast, the conceptualization of risky cybersecurity behavior as a theoretical construct
is inadequate and needs further development. Currently, the risky cybersecurity behaviors scale appears
to be a relevant, but a random collection of behaviors that introduce risk in disparate ways. For instance,
using the same password for multiple accounts and disabling anti-virus software are both risky behaviors.
However, they are not likely to be the result of the same causal variables, nor is it likely that they can be
combated using the same techniques.
We conduct two forms of exploratory data analyses in a search of patterns: a factor analysis of survey
participant responses and an examination of the correlations of each behavior with each of the three
forms of impulsivity.
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Factor Analysis in Search of a Typology

The objective of the exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was to discover the structure of RScB scale used in
the study. The EFA method used was the principal axis factoring method with Promax rotation. We used
eigen value greater than 1 as the extraction criteria. The results from the statistical analysis were as
follows: Three factors emerged from our EFA (see Table 8). The three factors explain 74.5% of the total
variance. While most of items load on factor one, items 3, 4 and 6 were loaded on a second factor, and,
items 11 and 18 loaded on the third factor. One item, item 17, did not load onto any of the factors.
Table 8. Factor Analysis
Items
1 Sharing passwords with friends and colleagues.
8 Downloading free anti-virus software from an unknown source.
9 Disabling the anti-virus on my work computer so that I can download
information from websites.
16 Sending personal information to strangers over the Internet.
15 Clicking on links contained in unsolicited emails from an unknown source.
5 Entering payment information on websites that have no clear security
information/certification
19 Downloading data and material from websites on my work computer without
checking its authenticity.
12 Downloading digital media (music, films, games) from unlicensed sources
20 Storing company information on my personal electronic device (e.g.
smartphone/tablet/laptop)
10 Bringing in my own USB to work in order to transfer data onto it.
7 Relying on a trusted friend or colleague to advise you on aspects of onlinesecurity.
14 Accepting friend requests on social media because you recognize the photo.
2 Using or creating passwords that are not very complicated (e.g. family name
and date of birth).
13 Sharing my current location on social media.
4 Using online storage systems to exchange and keep personal or sensitive
information.
3 Using the same password for multiple websites.
6 Using free-to-access public Wi-Fi.
11* Checking that software for your smartphone/tablet/laptop/PC is up-to-date.
18* Checking for updates to any anti-virus software you have installed.
×17 Clicking on links contained in an email from a trusted friend or work
colleague.

Factor1
0.955
0.950

Factor2
-0.119
-0.145

Factor3
-0.141
-0.039

0.902
0.900
0.884

-0.058
-0.11
-0.067

-0.053
0.027
0.039

0.838

0.111

-0.16

0.833
0.616

-0.028
0.097

0.055
0.092

0.561
0.491

0.105
0.019

0.091
0.285

0.680
0.586

0.115
0.117

-0.01
0.14

0.582
0.446

0.214
0.172

-0.177
0.146

0.204

0.501

-0.015

-0.137
0.09
0.198
-0.133

0.731
0.442
-0.055
0.209

-0.118
0.134
-0.720
-0.683

0.057

0.282

0.346

*reverse coded; × item shows cross loadings on factors 2 and 3

We examined the statistical results to see if the items in each factor converged to an identifiable
conceptual theme. Our principal finding in the factor analysis is that factors 1 and 2 do not exhibit
conceptual convergence, but factor 3 does. The lack of conceptual convergence in factors 1 and 2 is
inferred from two observations. First, each factor includes items that are not conceptually consistent. The
activities in factor 1 included disparate issues (i.e., issues related to access control, downloading, and
clicking on links). The activities in factor 2 included data storage, access control and network issues.
Second, items that should logically fall under the same factor do not (i.e., two access control items load on
factor 1 (Item 1: Sharing passwords with friends and colleagues, Item 2: Using or creating passwords that
are not very complicated (e.g. family name and date of birth)) and one access control item loads onto
factor 2 (Item 3: Using the same password for multiple websites). Thus, eighteen of the twenty items are
not classified consistently in the exploratory factor analysis. The two items that load on factor 3 are
planning-related items, helping us identify one conceptually consistent factor. In other words, there is
conceptual convergence for only one of the three factors. Overall, the factor analysis is insufficiently
helpful in clearly identifying the concepts underlying RScB. However, it can still shed some useful light in
other ways.
From, an examination of the instructions given to the respondents, it appears more likely that each factor
includes items that are performed at approximately the same frequency. The RScB scale asked
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participants to state how often they had engaged in a particular unsafe cybersecurity activity during a
previous six-month period. It was scored on a 7-point scale (0=never to 6=daily). Thus, it could be said
that each factor includes activities that are performed at approximately the same frequency. The
frequency with which an act is engaged in depends on how often the need or occasion to engage in that
act arises and how likely it is that the user engages in that act.
The range of scores for all items is between 0 (never) and 6 (daily). We examined the medians because
the distribution of the responses is skewed for each risky behavior item. Most activities in factor 1 have a
median score of 0 (never) and some have a median score of 1 (once every three months). Overall, this
indicates that users engage infrequently in the most risky activities. Despite the infrequency, there is
considerable risk because every instance of rule transgression can result in substantial exposure or
damage to information assets. One item in factor 2 (item 4) has a median score of 1 (once every three
months) and two items (3 and 6) have a median of 3 (once a month). Item 4 (Using online storage
systems to exchange and keep personal or sensitive information), which has a median score of 1, could
be risky if the online storage systems are insecure, but the use of online storage services provided to
employees by employer organizations or private services (e.g., Carbonite) available to individual
customers are legitimate and secure ways to back up data. Thus, the frequency for this item may not be of
concern or not dependent on the security of the system on which the information is stored. The other two
items (3 and 6) which have median scores of 3 (once a month) seem to be more reflective of the
frequency with which those acts have to be performed. For most users, creating passwords for websites is
not a frequent occurrence. A median score of 3 (once a month) suggests that users may be re-using the
same password for new websites may be common. A deeper examination of this issue may be warranted.
The need to use public Wi-Fi (item 6) may arise for most users only when they are traveling because
private Wi-Fi is usually available at work or at home.
The two items (11 and 18) in factor 3 both relate to updating software, which is a planned activity and is
likely to be executed at pre-determined frequencies. The median score of 3 for both items is reflective of
the frequency with which these acts have been scheduled to be performed.
By examining the data carefully, it is possible to determine which factors need to be addressed with the
user in terms of reducing overall risk. Users appear to accept that some actions are risky and are more
careful about not engaging in them. For instance, most users will encounter ‘links embedded in emails
from unknown sources’ (item 15) almost on a daily basis. The frequency with which they click on such
links has a median score of 0 (never), indicating that most users realize that clicking on embedded links is
dangerous. On the other hand, users appear to be less convinced of the riskiness of other items, (e.g.,
‘using same password for multiple websites’ (item 3)). The occasions for signing on to a new website are
infrequent, and the median score of 3 (once a month) for this suggests that some users are using the
same password almost every time they create a new account. This attitude of users needs to be
addressed to avoid potential problems. Thus, individual behaviors have to be examined to determine user
acknowledgement of the behavior as risky, and attention paid to those behaviors that the user has failed
to accept as risky. We add the caveat that our statements are based on exploratory analysis of available
data, and more rigorous data gathering is warranted before definitive conclusions are arrived at.
A second way of looking for qualitative patterns is to examine which dimensions of impulsivity individual
items correlate to, if any. In the next section, we use this approach to look for such patterns.

5.2

Correlations of Impulsivity Dimensions to Individual Risky Security Behaviors

The objective of exploring the correlations of the impulsivity dimensions to the individual risky security
behaviors was to identify if particular risky behaviors were more susceptible to a specific dimension of
impulsivity. The results from the statistical analysis (i.e., the correlations of each item with each of the
three dimensions of impulsivity are shown in Table 9) indicate that thirteen items (1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 19, 20) are significantly correlated to both motor and attentional impulsivities, five items (3, 6,
7, 10 and 17) are significantly correlated to motor impulsivity and two items (11 and 18) are correlated
only to non-planning impulsivity. It should be noted that item 11 is correlated at p<0.05 level and item 18 is
correlated only at p<0.10 level. It should also be noted that for all items, with the exceptions of items of 11
and 18, motor impulsivity is more highly correlated to the individual risky behavior than attentional
impulsivity.
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Table 9. Correlation Results of Risky Cybersecurity Behaviors and Impulsivity
Attention
RScB items
1 Sharing passwords with friends and colleagues.
2 Using or creating passwords that are not very complicated (e.g. family
name and date of birth).
3 Using the same password for multiple websites.
4 Using online storage systems to exchange and keep personal or
sensitive information.
5 Entering payment information on websites that have no clear security
information/certification
6 Using free-to-access public Wi-Fi
7 Relying on a trusted friend or colleague to advise you on aspects of
online-security.
8 Downloading free anti-virus software from an unknown source.
9 Disabling the anti-virus on my work computer so that I can download
information from websites.
10 Bringing in my own USB to work in order to transfer data onto it.
11* Checking that software for your smartphone/tablet/laptop/PC is upto-date.
12 Downloading digital media (music, films, games) from unlicensed
sources
13 Sharing my current location on social media.
14 Accepting friend requests on social media because you recognize the
photo.
15 Clicking on links contained in unsolicited emails from an unknown
source.
16 Sending personal information to strangers over the Internet.
17 Clicking on links contained in an email from a trusted friend or work
colleague.
18* Checking for updates to any anti-virus software you have installed.
19 Downloading data and material from websites on my work computer
without checking its authenticity.
20 Storing company information on my personal electronic device (e.g.
smartphone/tablet/laptop)
**p<0.01; * p<0.05; ^ marginal significance

0.256***

Motor
0.566***

non
planning
0.092

0.186**
0.044

0.425***
0.219**

0.06
0.034

0.222***

0.443***

0.072

0.217**
0.113

0.546***
0.24***

0.065
-0.01

0.093
0.195***

0.441***
0.501***

-0.024
0.073

0.192**
0.031

0.539***
0.364***

0.046
-0.071

0.12

-0.015

0.167**

0.166**
0.126**

0.45***
0.441***

0.007
0.074

0.128**

0.469***

0.023

0.131**
0.191**

0.575***
0.559***

0.02
0.08

0.05
0.082

0.285***
-0.123

-0.026
0.115^

0.149**

0.6***

0.105

0.152**

0.436***

-0.008

The salient finding is that neither the thirteen items that are correlated to both motor and attentional
impulsivities, nor the five items correlated to motor impulsivity alone show a clear underlying conceptual
theme. Also, the two items correlated only to non-planning impulsivity (items 11 and 18) relate to actions –
checking for updates – that can be planned ahead of time, scheduled, and executed, and thus their
correlation to non-planning impulsivity is consistent with expectations.
An alternate way of viewing the correlations of the eighteen items (the twenty items excluding planningrelated items 11 and 18) would be to say that the correlation to motor impulsivity is higher than the
correlation to attentional impulsivity. These items refer to activities that are not planned ahead of time for
execution at a particular point in time. A user may resolve not to engage in an activity (e.g., he/she may
resolve not to use the same password for two accounts) but such resolutions are likely to be violated if the
need to create a new password comes up unexpectedly. A user is likely to create the password on the
spur of the moment, possibly contravening prior resolutions about rules to follow. Such spur-of-themoment actions are reflective of motor impulsivity. An examination of each of the items correlating
significantly to motor impulsivity indicates that they are all susceptible to spur-of-the-moment actions.
The RScB items that are significantly correlated to attentional impulsivity are subject to uncertainty about
the decision or a lack of focus, consistent with the definition of attentional impulsivity. An example of a
decision that may produce uncertainty – the decision of whether to share a password with a friend or
colleague may produce a conflict (i.e., the rule stating that one should not share passwords may conflict
with the normal desire of people to be cooperative with and trusting of friends). Those who score high on
attentional impulsivity are likely to succumb to the more ingrained and automated response to cooperate
with friends and colleagues in the face of conflicting choices. The lack of focus may be due to attempts to
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multi-task or due to external distractions. An example of actions that are likely to be susceptible to a lack
of focus would be ‘sharing current location on social media’. For this example, it is easier to accept that
the act may be performed in a moment of distraction. In effect, those who score higher on attentional
impulsivity are more likely to do it. In a similar vein, a common-sense explanation can be provided for
other items that correlate significantly with attentional impulsivity. What is more challenging is to
understand why some items did not correlate with attentional impulsivity. For example, clicking on a link
embedded in an email from a trusted source (item 17) does not correlate with attentional impulsivity. At a
common-sense level, one could argue that one is more likely to engage in this when one is distracted.
Thus, it is difficult to explain the absence of a significant correlation between this item and attentional
impulsivity.
In general, explanations of behavior based on variations of individual characteristics provide an
understanding of the behavior but are difficult to use in the development of solutions to problems of
security. One approach is to circumvent the role of individual characteristics (i.e., automate actions that
have to be taken, such as updates of software). Automated systems can be rigid and may curtail user
discretion or preferences. The other approach is to raise awareness of the role of the individual
characteristics among users and provide training to compensate for the individual differences. The
effectiveness of training remains to be demonstrated.
In the current context of the effects of impulsivity, some activities, such as updating software, can be
planned. Users with higher non-planning impulsivity may still fail to execute. This can be compensated for
by automating the process. In other words, the effects of non-planning impulsivity can be compensated
for. Risky behaviors which are highly correlated to motor and attentional impulsivities are more difficult to
curb. Automation can be tried but is likely to lead to other problems. For instance, it may be possible to
use system generated passwords instead of user generated passwords, but this is likely to result in users
having a difficult time remembering passwords. Training may provide a starting point to encourage and
teach users to avoid common pitfalls, but has its limitations. For instance, users may be instructed to use
different passwords for different accounts, but as the number of accounts that each user has proliferates,
the user is likely to surrender to using a few passwords to facilitate remembering the passwords.
In effect, the relationship between impulsivity and risky security behaviors highlights one of the reasons
why cybersecurity remains intractable.

6

Conclusion

Our primary goal was to replicate the Hadlington (2017) study on the influence of impulsivity on risky
cybersecurity behavior and to explore the data in search of additional insights. Our replication shows that
the results of the original study are mostly robust. It also increases confidence in the Abbreviated Barratt
Impulsivity Scale (Coutlee et al., 2014) and in the explanatory potential of impulsivity on risky
cybersecurity behaviors. It is evident that there is much scope for research on the effects of impulsivity in
the area of cybersecurity behaviors. Hadlington’s article provides the initial empirical basis for a
relationship between impulsivity and risky cybersecurity behavior and the replication bolsters the support
for the existence of linkage.
A cursory examination is sufficient to indicate the need for a more rigorous conceptualization of the
construct, risky cybersecurity behavior. Exploratory factor analysis produced three factors, each of which
is reflective of the frequency with which users perform those acts. However, this does not provide
conceptual clarity of risky cybersecurity behavior, nor does it enhance our understanding of the role of
impulsivity. However, a review of responses to individual items is helpful in understanding user perception
of what they consider risky. An examination of the correlations of each item with each of the three
dimensions of impulsivity provides some useful insight. It indicates that actions that can be planned, i.e., a
specific time set for them, such as updating software, are susceptible to non-planning impulsivity. Other
actions, usually actions from which the user should refrain, are difficult to plan, i.e., the occasions when
they need to be (not) performed appear somewhat randomly, and during the course of other activities.
Such actions may be performed spontaneously despite any prior resolve by users not to engage in them.
They are susceptible primarily to motor impulsivity, and to a much lesser extent to attentional impulsivity.
The exploratory analysis with correlations of impulsivity with each item clearly shows that motor impulsivity
is the most important dimension in disinhibiting user behavior with respect to engaging in unsafe actions.
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In sum, we have confirmed that the personality characteristic impulsivity is highly correlated to risky
cybersecurity behaviors, and is therefore important in understanding the behaviors. Additionally, we have
provided preliminary empirical evidence for the possible influence of different dimensions of impulsivity on
different risky cybersecurity behaviors. Further research needs to be done to develop a theory-based
conceptual structure for risky cybersecurity behaviors before undertaking to develop a theoretical model of
the relationship between impulsivity and risky cybersecurity behaviors.
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Appendix A: Measurement Items
Table A1. Measurement Items
Items

Construct

1 Sharing passwords with friends and colleagues.
2 Using or creating passwords that are not very complicated (e.g. family name and date of birth).
3 Using the same password for multiple websites.
4 Using online storage systems to exchange and keep personal or sensitive information.
5 Entering payment information on websites that have no clear security information/certification.
6 Using free-to-access public Wi-Fi.
7 Relying on a trusted friend or colleague to advise you on aspects of online-security.
8 Downloading free anti-virus software from an unknown source.
9 Disabling the anti-virus on my work computer so that I can download information from websites.
10 Bringing in my own USB to work in order to transfer data onto it.
11* Checking that software for your smartphone/tablet/laptop/PC is up-to-date.
12 Downloading digital media (music, films, games) from unlicensed sources
13 Sharing my current location on social media.
14 Accepting friend requests on social media because you recognize the photo.
15 Clicking on links contained in unsolicited emails from an unknown source.
16 Sending personal information to strangers over the Internet.
17 Clicking on links contained in an email from a trusted friend or work colleague.
18* Checking for updates to any anti-virus software you have installed.
19 Downloading data and material from websites on my work computer without checking its
authenticity.
20 Storing company information on my personal electronic device (e.g. smartphone/tablet/laptop).

Risky
Cybersecurity
Behaviors
(RScB)

Attention
1.
I don’t “pay attention.”
2.
I am self-controlled.
3.
I concentrate easily.
4.
I am a careful thinker.
5.
I am a steady thinker.
Motor
6.
I do things without thinking.
7.
I say things without thinking.
8.
I act “on impulse”.
9.
I act on the spur of the moment.
Non planning

Impulsivity

10.
I plan tasks carefully.
11.
I plan trips well ahead of time.
12.
I plan for job security.
13.
I am future oriented.
1 I think that management have the responsibility to ensure a company is protected from cybercrime.
2* I am aware of my role in keeping the company protected from potential cybercriminals.
3 I believe everyone in the company has a role to play in protecting against threats from cybercriminals.
4 It is hard to know how I can help protect the organization from cybercrime.
5 I don't have the right skills to be able to protect the organization from cybercrime.
6 I do not feel that IT security is a priority within my organization.
7 Computer systems provide all the protection a company needs.
8 I think that reporting cybercrime is a waste of time.
9 The police lack the capacity to deal with cybercrime effectively.
10 I believe that cybercriminals are more advanced than the people who are supposed to be protecting us.
11 I think that information provided by the government and police on cybercrime is not relevant to
businesses.
12 I feel that the police are far too busy to deal with cybercrime.
13 I worry that if I report a cyberattack to the police it might damage the reputation of the company
14* I think more could be done to communicate the risks from cybercrime to individuals in the
organization.
15* I am aware of the company's IT use policy and attempt to follow it.
16 I would not know how to report a cyberattack if one happened.
17 I don't think that reporting a cyberattack on the company is my responsibility.
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Table A1. Measurement Items
18 I don’t pay attention to company material about the threats from cybercrime.
19* I am confident that I would be able to spot the signs of a cyberattack.
20* I think the biggest threat for IT systems comes from people within the company.
21* I feel that any individual within the company are at risk of manipulation from confidence tricksters.
22 I think that cyber criminals only target a company when there is a substantial financial gain.
23 I believe only large companies are targeted by hackers and cybercriminals.
24 I feel that only companies that take payments using online systems are at risk of being victims of
cybercrime.
25 I don't think I know who is responsible for protecting the company from cybercrime.
I am most comfortable online.
I feel safest when I am on the internet.
You can get to know a person better on the internet than in person.
I often find it peaceful to be online.
I can be myself online.
I get more respect online than “in real life”.
People accept me for who I am online.
Online relationships can be more fulfilling than offline.
I am at my best when I am online.
I wish my friends and family know how people regard me online.
The internet is more “real” than real life.
I say or do things on the internet that I can never do online.
When I am online I can be carefree.
Few people love me other than those I know online.
I am less lonely when I am online.
I cannot see myself ever without the internet for too long.
The internet is an important part of my life.
I feel helpless when I don’t have access to the internet.
I am bothered by my inability to stop using internet so much.
I often keep thinking about something I experienced online well after I have logged off.
When I am on the internet I often feel a kind of “rush” or emotional high.
I use the internet more than I ought to.
People complain that I use the internet too much.
I never stay no longer than I had planned.
When I am not online I often think about the internet.
The offline world is less exciting than what I can do online.
I can’t stop thinking about the internet.
Even though there are times that I would like to, I can’t cut down on my use of the internet.
My use of the internet sometimes seems beyond my control.
When I am online I don’t think about my responsibilities.
When I have nothing better to do, I go online.
I find that I go online more when I have something else I am supposed to do.
When I am online I don’t need to think about offline problems.
I sometimes use the internet to procrastinate.
I often use the internet to avoid doing unpleasant things.
Using the internet is a way to forget about the things I must do but don’t really want to do.
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